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Abstract
We put forward an interface and component algebra through which we characterise
fundamental structures that support service-oriented design independently of the spe-
cific formalisms that may be adopted to provide models for languages or analysis tools.
We view services as an interface mechanism that can be superposed over a component
infrastructure, what is sometimes referred to as a ‘service overlay’. The component
algebra consists of networks of processes that interact asynchronously through com-
munication channels. A service interface offers properties to potential clients and re-
quires properties of external services that, at run time, may need to be discovered and
bound to the orchestration of the service. We define what it means for an asynchronous
relational net to orchestrate a service interface and prove a number of compositionally
results that relate the operations of both algebras. One of the major results of the paper
is the characterisation of a sub-class of asynchronous relational nets over which we
can guarantee that, when binding, through their interfaces, a client and a supplier ser-
vice, the composition of the orchestrations of the two services is consistent, i.e., both
services can work together as interconnected.
Keywords: asynchronous process networks, component algebra, interface algebra,
orchestration, service-oriented computing, temporal logic
1. Introduction
In [18], de Alfaro and Henzinger put forward a number of important insights,
backed up by mathematical models, that led to an abstract characterisation of essen-
tial aspects of component-based software design (CBD), namely the distinction be-
tween the notions of component and interface, and the way they relate to each other.
This separation is important because component and interface models capture different
aspects of software system engineering: the former characterise the way components
behave in an arbitrary environment and support verification; the latter characterise what
components offer to and expect from the environment, and support design.
In this paper, we take stock of the work that we developed in the FET-GC2 inte-
grated project SENSORIA [55] around a language (SRML) and mathematical model for
service-oriented modelling [33], and investigate what abstractions can be put forward
for service-oriented computing (SOC) that relate to the notions of interface and com-
ponent algebra proposed in [18]. Our ultimate goal is to characterise the fundamental
structures that support SOC independently of the specific formalisms (Petri-nets, dif-
ferent kinds of automata or state machines, process calculi, inter alia) that may be
adopted to provide models for languages or analysis tools.
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This leeds us to explore (Sect. 1.1) the difference between CBD and SOC, which
is not uncontroversial. We view services as an interface mechanism that can be su-
perposed over a component infrastructure, what is sometimes referred to as a ‘service
overlay’. Our interface theory formalises this view, which results in component and
interface algebras that differ in fundamental points from those proposed in [18]. They
also differ substantially from other notions of web-service interface that have been pro-
posed in the literature, e.g., [9], in that our notion of composition is not for integration
(as in CBD) but for dynamic interconnection of processes: the interfaces used in [9]
are meant for design-time composition, the client being statically bound to the invoked
service (which is the same for all invocations); the interfaces that we proposed address
a different form of composition in which the provider is procured at run time and,
therefore, can differ from one invocation to the next. This difference is also reflected
in the fact that our component algebra consists of asynchronous networks of processes
(distributed orchestrations), not individual processes. Therefore, our first contribution
is in providing an interface and a component algebra that better reflect SOC as an en-
gineering paradigm, for example the Service Component Architecture (SCA) [47].
In relation to SRML and our previous work in SENSORIA (e.g., [30, 31, 33]), this
paper separates the component from the interface algebra (the notion of module in
SRML corresponds to an orchestrated interface), which allows us to address aspects
such as consistency, abstraction and refinement, which are essential for the toolbox of
any software engineer. Our second contribution is, therefore, the formalisation of those
aspects as applied to SOC, especially consistency: one of the major results of the paper
is the characterisation of a sub-class of asynchronous networks of processes over which
we can guarantee that, when binding, through their interfaces, a client and a supplier
service, the composition of the orchestrations of the two services is consistent, i.e.,
both services can work together as interconnected. That is, consistency can be checked
at design time, not at the time of binding (which in SOC is done at run time). Once
again, this captures a major difference between CBD and SOC.
1.1. Services vs. components, informally
A question that, in this context, cannot be avoided, concerns the difference between
component-based and service-oriented design. The view that we adopt herein is that, on
the one hand, services offer a layer of activity that can be superposed over a component
infrastructure (what is sometimes referred to as a ‘service overlay’) and, on the other
hand, the nature of the interactions that are needed to support such a service overlay is
intrinsically asynchronous and conversational, which requires a notion of component
algebra that is different from the ones investigated in [18] for CBD.
The difference between components and services, in what relates to the purpose
of this paper, can be explained in terms of two different notions of ‘composition’, re-
quiring two different notions of interface. In CBD, composition is integration-oriented
— “the idea of component-based development is to industrialise the software develop-
ment process by producing software applications by assembling prefabricated software
components” [22]. In other words, CBD addresses what, in [25] we have called ‘phys-
iological complexity’ — the ability to build a complex system by integrating a number
of independently developed parts. Hence, interfaces for component-based design must
describe the means through which software elements can be plugged together to build
a product and the assumptions made by each element on the environment in which it
will be deployed. Interfaces in the sense of [18] – such as assume/guarantee interfaces
– fall into this category: they specify the combinations of input values that components
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implementing an interface must accept from their environment (assumptions) and the
combinations of output values that the environment can expect from them (guarantees).
In contrast, services respond to the necessity for separating “need from the need-
fulfilment mechanism” [22] and address what in [25] we have called ‘social complex-
ity’: the ability of software elements to engage with other parties to pursue a given
business goal. For example, we can design a seller application that may need to use an
external supplier service if the local stock is low (the need); the discovery and selec-
tion of, and binding to, a specific supplier (the need-fulfilment mechanism) are not part
of the design of the seller but performed, at run time, by the underlying middleware
(service-oriented architecture) according to quality-of-service constraints. In this con-
text, service interfaces must describe the properties that are provided (so that the ser-
vices offered by applications can be discovered) as well as those that may be required
from external services (so that the middleware can select a proper provider). The latter
are not assumptions on the environment as in CBD — in a sense, through run-time dis-
covery and binding, applications create the environment in which they need to operate
in order to deliver the services that they promise (a form of dynamic reconfiguration
that we detail in [29]).
This difference has implications on the nature and properties of the algebras that
capture the operations on and relationships between design elements. For example,
in CBD, composition is commutative, reflecting that we are building something more
complex from simpler parts: software applications are composed as components of a
bigger whole; the process stops when the designer has assembled all the components
it needs. In SOC, composition is not commutative, reflecting the fact that it supports
the binding of a client to a supplier: the purpose is not to build a bigger whole but
to bind an application to the external suppliers that it needs to deliver a service. The
process continues if some of those suppliers, in turn, require external services, and so
on, leading to a dynamic form of composition that results in a configuration that cannot
be predicted at design time.
Concerning the key questions that [18] identifies for distinguishing between com-
ponents and interfaces, where the question What does it do? in the context of describing
components that communicate synchronously through I/O ports ultimately means How
are inputs transformed into outputs?, in SOC it should mean How are interactions or-
chestrated among a group of partners?; and where the question How can it be used?
in the context of describing component interfaces ultimately means What constraints
apply to the values that can be passed through the ports?, in SOC it should mean What
are the protocols that parties need to observe at the ports to engage with the service?.
These differences have important methodological and design implications as decisions
need to be made about whether coupling should be tight or loose, binding should be
static (at design time) or dynamic (at run time), communication should be synchronous
or asynchronous, and so on.
1.2. Overview of the paper
In the context of modelling and specifying services, one can find approaches of
two different kinds — choreography and orchestration — which are also reflected in
the languages and standards that have been proposed for Web services, namely WS-
CDL for choreography and WS-BPEL for orchestration. In a nutshell, choreography is
concerned with the specification and realizability of a ‘conversation’ among a (fixed)
number of peers that communicate with each other to deliver a service, whereas or-
chestration is concerned with the definition of a (possibly distributed) business process
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(or workflow) that may use external services discovered and bound to the process at
run time in order to deliver a service.
Whereas the majority of formal frameworks that have been developed for SOC
address choreography (see [51] for an overview), the approach that we take in this
paper is orchestration-oriented. More precisely, we propose to model the workflow
through which a service is orchestrated as being executed by a network of processes
that interact asynchronously and offer interaction-points to which clients and external
services (executed by their own networks) can bind. The questions that we propose to
answer are What is a suitable notion of interface for such asynchronous networks of
processes that deliver a service?, and What notion of interface composition is suitable
for the loose coupling of the business processes that orchestrate the interfaces?
The rest of this paper is technical and formal: our purpose is not to define an inter-
face language but, rather, characterise the fundamental structures that support software
engineering for SOC and the way it differs from CBD. Methodological aspects of our
approach can be found in previous publications, e.g., [1, 10, 11, 33].
In Section 2, we present a ‘component algebra’ that builds on networks of pro-
cesses that communicate asynchronously, i.e., components are networks. We define a
law of composition and an abstraction mechanism that we prove to be compositional. A
significant part of this section is dedicated to the characterisation of a subclass of asyn-
chronous relational nets that are guaranteed to be consistent (i.e., they admit at least one
run that projects to valid runs of the processes in the network and the channels through
which they communicate) and closed under composition. This characterisation is given
in terms of properties that can be checked at design time; checking for consistency at
discovery time would not be credible because, in SOC, there is no time for the tradi-
tional design-time integration and validation activities as the SOA middleware brokers
need to discover and bind services at run time.
This leads us to the characterisation of services as an ‘interface algebra’ (again
in the sense of [18]), which we develop in Section 3. Interfaces involve the specifi-
cation of behaviour in terms of temporal logic. More precisely, an interface consists
of a provides-point through which properties that are offered to clients of the service
can be specified, and a collection of requires-points through which properties can be
specified that are required of the external services that, at run time, may need to be
discovered and of the channels through which they will bind to the orchestration of the
service. We define a law of composition and a refinement mechanism that we prove to
be compositional.
Figure 1 summarises the formalisms used in the paper. The interface algebra builds
on specification logics (Sect. 3.1) – a form of institutions [36], an example of which is
SAFETY-LTL (Sect. 3.5), a version of Parametric Temporal Logic – PLTL [4] where
intervals are finite and bounded by constants. The algebra includes operations of com-
position (Sect. 3.3) and refinement (Sect. 3.4). The component algebra builds on the
topological space of infinite traces (Sect. 2.1), and includes operations of composition
(Sect. 2.4) and abstraction (Sect. 2.5).
The two algebras are connected by defining what it means for an asynchronous
relational net to orchestrate a service interface (Sect. 3.2). The notion of orchestration
is based on the satisfaction relation of the specification logics, which relates sets of
traces with sentences. We prove a number of compositionality results that relate the
operations of both algebras, which use the algebraic properties of specification logics
as institutions. Those results allow us to formulate properties that guarantee that, when
binding, through their interfaces, a client and a supplier service, the composition of the
orchestrations of the two services is consistent, i.e., both services can work together as
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Figure 1: Summary of the formalisms used in the paper.
interconnected.
A third formalism accounts for the means through which components can be ac-
tually implemented. Typically, this involves some notion of ‘machine’ that generates
sets of traces, an example of which are Bu¨chi automata (Sect. 2.4). In this paper, we
do not develop a corresponding ‘machine algebra’, which could build, for example, on
operations of composition and simulation over automata. The advantage of building
the component algebra over sets of traces is that it makes our results independent of
the specific choice of machine, which in the literature on services include, for example,
Petri-nets [49] and guarded automata [34] as abstractions of web services orchestrated
in BPEL (the Business Process Execution Language [52]) .
In Section 4, we compare our framework with formal models that have been pro-
posed in the last few years for SOC, including [7, 9, 35]. Finally, we conclude with a
summary of the results obtained in the paper and a discussion of further work.
The paper builds on two of our previous papers ([27, 28]) but extends them in a
significant way. In relation to [27], the component algebra has been changed to that of
[28] in order to use the topological properties that are required to address consistency
of composition. A notion of component abstraction has also been added, which had
not been previously defined. Sect. 3 is almost totally new. On the one hand, the notion
of orchestration proposed in [27] had to be redefined in order to take into account
the revised component algebra and build on the new notion of component abstraction.
On the other hand, a notion of interface refinement was introduced, for which several
compositionality results had to be proved.
2. The component algebra
In this paper, we adopt the view that services are delivered by systems of compo-
nents as in the Service Component Architecture (SCA) [47]:
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“SCA is a model designed for SOA, unlike existing systems that have been adapted
to SOA. SCA enables encapsulating or adapting existing applications and data us-
ing an SOA abstraction. SCA builds on service encapsulation to take into account
the unique needs associated with the assembly of networks of heterogeneous ser-
vices.
SCA provides the means to compose assets, which have been implemented using
a variety of technologies using SOA. The SCA composition becomes a service,
which can be accessed and reused in a uniform manner. In addition, the compos-
ite service itself can be composed with other services [...]. SCA service compo-
nents can be built with a variety of technologies such as EJBs, Spring beans and
CORBA components, and with programming languages including Java, PHP and
C++ [...]. SCA components can also be connected by a variety of bindings such as
WSDL/SOAP web services, JavaTM Message Service (JMS) for message-oriented
middleware systems and J2EETM Connector Architecture (JCA)”.
In the terminology of [18], we can see components in the sense of SCA as imple-
menting processes that are connected by channels. However, there is a major difference
in the way processes are connected. In [18], and indeed many models used for ser-
vice choreography and orchestration (e.g., [7, 16, 49]), communication is synchronous
(based on I/O connections). In order to capture the forms of loose coupling that SOAs
support, communication should be asynchronous: in most business scenarios, the tra-
ditional synchronous call-and-return style of interaction is simply not appropriate. This
leads us to propose a model that is closer to communicating finite-state machines [13]
(also adopted in [8]) than, say, I/O automata [42]. We call our (service) component
algebra asynchronous relational nets (ARNs).
2.1. Preliminaries
The processes that execute in SOC are typically open, reactive and interactive.
Their behaviour can be observed in terms of the actions that they perform. For sim-
plicity, we use a linear time model, i.e., we observe streams of actions. In order not
to constrain the environment in which processes execute and communicate, we take
streams that capture complete behaviours to be infinite (which we call traces) and we
allow several actions to occur ‘simultaneously’, i.e., the granularity of observations
may not be so fine that we can always tell which of two actions occurred first. The
execution of an empty set of actions corresponds to a step during which a process is
idle, i.e., a step performed by the environment without the involvement of the process.
The following definition sets out terminology and notation that is used throughout
the paper.
Definition 2.1 (Trace, segment, and property). Let A be a finite set (of actions).
• A trace λ over A is an element of (2A)ω , i.e., an infinite sequence of sets of
actions. We denote by λ(i) the (i+1)-th element of λ, by λi the prefix of λ that
ends at λ(i), and by λi the suffix of λ that starts at λ(i).
• A segment overA is an element of (2A)∗, i.e., a finite sequence of sets of actions.
We use pi≺λ to mean that the segment pi is a prefix of λ.
• Given A′⊆A and a segment pi, we denote by (pi·A′) the segment obtained by
adding A′ at the end of pi. We use the same symbol to denote the concatenation
of segments (pi1 · pi2) and of segments with traces (pi · λ).
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• A property Λ over A is a subset of (2A)ω .
Notice that finite behaviours can be captured through traces that, after some point,
consist only of the empty set, i.e., they are of the form pi.∅ω where pi∈(2A)∗.
Definition 2.2 (Closure). Let A be a set and Λ a property over A. We define:
• Λf = {pi∈(2A)∗: ∃λ∈Λ(pi≺λ)}— the segments that are prefixes of traces in Λ,
also called the downward closure of Λ.
• Λ¯ = {λ∈(2A)ω: ∀pi≺λ(pi∈Λf )} — the traces whose prefixes are in Λf , also
called the closure of Λ.
• Λ is said to be closed iff Λ ⊇ Λ¯ (and, hence, Λ = Λ¯).
The closure operator on (2A)ω is defined according to the Cantor topology used in
[2] for characterising safety and liveness properties (see also [6]). In that topology, the
closed sets are the safety properties (and the dense ones are the liveness properties).
Functions between sets of actions, which we call alphabet maps, are useful for
defining relationships between individual processes and the networks in which they
operate.
Definition 2.3 (Projection and translation). Let σ:A→B be a function (alphabet map).
• For every λ′∈(2B)ω , we define λ′|σ∈(2A)ω pointwise as λ′|σ(i)=σ−1(λ′(i)) —
the projection of λ′ over A. If σ is an inclusion, i.e., A⊆B, then we tend to write
|A instead of |σ; this is a function that, when applied to a trace, forgets the
actions of B that are not in A.
• For every property Λ⊆(2A)ω , we define σ(Λ) = {λ′∈(2B)ω : λ′|σ∈Λ} — the
translation of Λ to B.
We are particularly interested in translations defined by prefixing every element of
a set with a given symbol. Such translations are useful for identifying in a network the
process to which an action belongs — we do not assume that processes have mutually
disjoint alphabets. More precisely, given a set A and a symbol p, we denote by (p. )
the function that prefixes the elements of A with ‘p.’. Note that prefixing defines a
bijection between A and its image (p.A).
Alphabet maps induce translations that preserve closed properties:
Proposition 2.4 (Translation). Let σ:A→B be an alphabet map. For every closed
property Λ over A, σ(Λ) is a closed property over B.
Proof. This is a simple property of the topological space defined by traces.
2.2. Asynchronous relational nets
In an asynchronous communication model, interactions are based on the exchange
of messages that are transmitted through channels (wires in the terminology of SCA).
For simplicity, we ignore the data that messages may carry. We organise messages in
sets that we call ports. More specifically, every process consists of a (finite) collection
of mutually disjoint ports, i.e., each message that a process can exchange belongs to
exactly one of its ports. Ports are communication abstractions that are convenient for
organising networks of processes as formalised below.
Every message belonging to a port has an associated polarity: − if it is an outgoing
message (published at the port) and + if it is incoming (delivered at the port). This is
the notation proposed in [13] and also adopted in [7].
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Definition 2.5 (Port and message polarity). A port is a finite set (of messages). Every
port M has a partition M− ∪M+. The messages in M− are said to have polarity − ,
and those in M+ have polarity +.
The actions of sending (publishing) or receiving (being delivered) a message m are
denoted by m! and m¡, respectively.
Definition 2.6 (Action). Let M be a port and m∈M .
• The set of actions associated with M− is AM− = {m! : m∈M−}.
• The set of actions associated with M+ is AM+ = {m¡ : m∈M+}.
• The set of actions associated with M is AM = AM− ∪AM+ .
A process is a non-empty property over the alphabet generated from a finite set of
mutually disjoint ports:
Definition 2.7 (Process). A process consists of:
• A finite set γ of mutually disjoint ports.
• A non-empty property Λ over Aγ =
⋃
M∈γ AM .
We also define A+γ =
⋃
M∈γ AM+ and A
−
γ =
⋃
M∈γ AM− .
Interactions are established through channels. Channels transmit messages both
ways, i.e., they are bidirectional, which is consistent with [13]. Notice that, in some
formalisms (e.g., [8]), channels are unidirectional, which is not so convenient for cap-
turing typical forms of conversation that, like in SCA, are two-way: a request sent by
the sender through a wire has a reply sent by the receiver through the same wire (chan-
nel). This means that channels are agnostic in what concerns the polarity of messages:
these are only meaningful within ports.
Definition 2.8 (Channel). A channel consists of:
• A set M of messages.
• A non-empty property Λ over the alphabet AM = {m!,m¡ : m ∈M}.
We also define A+M = {m¡ : m∈M} and A−M = {m! : m∈M}.
Notice that in [8] as well as other asynchronous communication models adopted
for choreography, when sent, messages are inserted in the queue of the consumer. In
the context of loose coupling that is of interest for SOC, channels (wires) may have
a behaviour of their own that one may wish to describe or, in the context of inter-
faces, specify. Therefore, for generality, we take channels as first-class entities that
are responsible for delivering messages and, hence, may have their own buffers. More
specifically, we consider that the publication of messages are inputs for channels and
the delivery of messages are inputs for processes.
Channels connect processes through their ports. Formally, the connections are es-
tablished through what we call attachments:
Definition 2.9 (Connection). Let M1 and M2 be ports and 〈M,Λ〉 a channel. A con-
nection between M1 and M2 via 〈M,Λ〉 consists of a pair of injections µi:M→Mi
such that µ−1i (M
+
i ) = µ
−1
j (M
−
j ), {i, j}={1, 2}. Each injection µi is called the
attachment of 〈M,Λ〉 to Mi. We denote the connection by 〈M1 µ1←−M µ2−→M2,Λ〉.
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A connection establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the two ports such
that any two messages that are connected have opposite polarities. The fact that the
attachments are injections but not necessarily bijections means that the correspondence
may be partial: some of the messages of M1 or M2 may end up not being connected.
Proposition 2.10. Every connection 〈M1 µ1←−M µ2−→M2,Λ〉 defines an injection 〈µ1, µ2〉
from AM to AM1∪AM2 as follows: for every m∈M and {i, j}={1, 2}, if µi(m)∈M−i
then 〈µ1, µ2〉(m!) = µi(m)! and 〈µ1, µ2〉(m¡) = µj(m)¡.
Definition 2.11 (Asynchronous relational net). An asynchronous relational net (ARN)
α consists of:
• A simple finite graph 〈P,C〉 where P is a set of nodes and C is a set of edges.
Note that each edge is an unordered pair {p, q} of nodes.
• A labelling function that assigns a process 〈γp,Λp〉 to every node p and a con-
nection 〈γc,Λc〉 to every edge c such that:
– If c={p, q} then γc is a pair of attachments 〈Mp µp←−Mc µq−→Mq〉 for some
Mp∈γp and Mq∈γq .
– If γ{p,q}=〈Mp µp←− M{p,q} µq−→ Mq〉 and γ{p,q′}=〈M ′p µ
′
p←− M{p,q′} µ
′
q′−→ M ′q′〉
with q 6= q′, then Mp 6= M ′p — i.e., different channels cannot share ports.
We also define the following sets and mappings:
• Aα =
⋃
p∈P p.Aγp is the language associated with α.
• For every p∈P , ιp is the function that mapsAγp toAα, which prefixes the actions
of Aγp with p.
• For every c∈C, ιc is the function that maps AMc to Aα, which, assuming that
c = {p, q}, translates the actions of AMc through 〈p. ◦ µp, q. ◦ µq〉.
• Λα = {λ∈(2Aα)ω: ∀p∈P (λ|ιp∈Λp) ∧ ∀c∈C(λ|ιc∈Λc)}.
Note that, for every p∈P , ( |ιp) first removes the actions that are not in the language
p.Ap and then removes the prefix p. Similarly, for every c = {p, q}∈C, ( |ιc) first
removes the actions that are not in the language 〈p. ◦µp, q. ◦µq〉(AMc), then removes
the prefixes p and q, and then projects onto the language of Mc.
We often refer to the ARN through the quadruple 〈P,C, γ,Λ〉 where γ returns the
set of ports of the processes that label the nodes and the pair of attachments of the
connections that label the edges, and Λ returns the corresponding properties. The fact
that the graph is simple – undirected, without self-loops or multiple edges – means
that all interactions between two given processes are supported by a single channel and
that no process can interact with itself. The graph is undirected because, as already
mentioned, channels are bidirectional.
The alphabet ofAα is the union of the alphabets of the processes involved translated
by prefixing all actions with the node from which they originate (see the definition of
this translation after Def. 2.3).
We take the set Λα to define the set of possible traces observed on α – those traces
over the alphabet of the ARN that are projected to traces of all its processes and chan-
nels. Notice that
Λα =
⋂
p∈P
ιp(Λp) ∩
⋂
c∈C
ιc(Λc)
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That is, the behaviour of the ARN is given by the intersection of the behaviour of the
processes and channels translated to the language of the ARN — this corresponds to
what one normally understands as a parallel composition.
Notice that nodes and edges denote instances of processes and channels, respec-
tively. Different nodes (resp. edges) can be labelled with the same process (resp.
channel), i.e., processes and channels act as types. This is why it is essential that,
in the ARN, it is possible to trace actions to the instances of processes where they
originate (all the actions of channels are mapped to actions of processes through the
attachments so it is enough to label actions with nodes). Also notice that the alphabets
of the channels are translated through the attachments in a way that is consistent with
the translations performed on process alphabets.
In order to illustrate the notions introduced in the paper, we consider a simplified
bank portal that mediates the interactions between clients and the bank in the context
of different business operations such as the request for a credit. Fig. 2 depicts an ARN
with two interconnected processes that implement that business operation. Process
Clerk is responsible for the interaction with the environment and for making decisions
on credit requests, for which it relies on the process RiskEvaluator that is able to
evaluate the risk of the transaction.
ClerkcreditReq
           Λ c
approved
denied
transferDate
RiskEvaluator
Λ w
request
result
getRisk
riskValueaccept
Lc
Rc Le
           Λe
Figure 2: An example of an ARN with two processes connected through a channel.
The graph of this ARN consists of two nodes c:Clerk and e:RiskEvaluator and
an edge {c, e}:wce where:
• Clerk is a process with two ports: Lc and Rc. In port Lc, the process receives
messages creditReq and accept and sends approved , denied and transferDate.
Port Rc has outgoing message getRisk and incoming message riskValue . The
behaviour of Clerk is as follows: immediately after the delivery of the first
creditReq message on port Lc, it publishes getRisk on Rc; then it waits five
steps for the delivery of riskValue , upon which it either publishes denied or
approved (we abstract from the criteria that it uses for deciding on the credit); if
riskValue does not arrive by the deadline, Clerk publishes denied on Lc; after
sending approved (if ever), Clerk waits twenty steps for the delivery of accept ,
upon which it sends transferDate; all other deliveries of creditReq and accept
are discarded. The property that corresponds to this behaviour is denoted by Λc
in Fig. 2.
• RiskEvaluator is a process with a single port (Le) with incoming message
request and outgoing message result . Its behaviour is quite simple: every time
request is delivered, it takes no more than three steps to publish result . The
property that corresponds to this behaviour is denoted by Λe in Fig. 2.
• The port Rc of Clerk is connected with the port Le of RiskEvaluator through
wce:〈Rc µc←− {m,n} µe−→ Le,Λw〉, with µc={m 7→ getRisk , n 7→ riskValue},
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µe= {m 7→ request , n 7→ result}. The corresponding channel is reliable: a m¡
follows every m! and a n¡ follows every n!. The property that corresponds to
this behaviour is denoted by Λw in Fig. 2.
The alphabet of this ARN is the language of actions generated by the set M of
messages defined by:
M+: c.creditReq , c.accept , c.riskValue , e.request
M−: c.approved , c.denied , c.transferDate, c.getRisk , e.result
In order to explain how the channels connect processes, consider a trace of the
channel wce of the form:
∅k1 ·m! ·m¡ · ∅k2 · n! · n¡ · ∅ω
The translation of this trace to the language of the ARN is a set of traces of the form
τ1 ·A1 ⊕ c.getRisk ! ·A2 ⊕ e.request¡ · τ2 ·A3 ⊕ e.result! ·A4 ⊕ c.riskValue¡ · λ
where the τi are segments of length ki, λ is a trace and Ai are sets of actions, none
of which intersects {c.getRisk !, e.request¡, e.result!, c.riskValue¡}. We use A⊕ a as
shorthand for A ∪ {a}.
That is, Clerk publishes getRisk , which the channel delivers to RiskEvaluator as
request ; after a while,RiskEvaluator publishes result , which the channel delivers to
Clerk as riskValue , both without any delay.
A class of very simple ARNs, which we call atomic, are those that consist of a
single process:
Definition 2.12 (ARN defined by a process). Given a process P , we define the ARN
νP whose graph consists of only one node, which is labelled with P .
2.3. Consistency
In [18], joint consistency of the descriptions of the processes and the connections is
required for a (component-based) relational net to be well defined. For asynchronous
relational nets, consistency can be formulated as follows:
Definition 2.13 (Consistent ARN). An ARN α is said to be consistent if Λα is not
empty.
Consistency of an ARN is an important property because it shows that there is
a joint trace of all the processes and channels that are part of the ARN. Naturally,
one cannot expect every ARN to be consistent as the interference established through
the connections may make it impossible for the processes involved to work together.
Therefore, it is important to know how one can determine whether an ARN is con-
sistent. Typically, this could be done at the level of automata (e.g., non-deterministic
Bu¨chi automata [54]) that implement the processes and channels of the ARN by com-
puting their product and checking that the resulting language is not empty, for example
as in [53, 54]. However, for reasons explained in more detail in Sect. 2.4, we would like
to have a more compositional way of checking for consistency, i.e., based on charac-
teristics of the processes and channels involved without having to compute the product
of the automata.
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For that purpose, a different (but related) property was found to be relevant. Con-
sistency is about infinite behaviours, i.e., it concerns the ability of all the processes and
channels of an ARN to generate a full joint trace. However, it does not guarantee that,
having engaged in a joint segment, the processes can proceed: it may happen that the
joint segment is not a prefix of a joint (full) trace, which would be considered undesir-
able as it is not possible for individual processes to anticipate what other processes will
do. Therefore, another intuitive (and important) property of an ARN is that, after any
joint segment, a joint step can be performed1.
Definition 2.14 (Progress-enabled ARN). For every ARN α, let
Πα = {pi∈2Aα∗: ∀p∈P (pi|ιp∈Λfp) ∧ ∀c∈C(pi|ιc∈Λfc )}
We say that α is progress-enabled iff
∀pi∈Πα.∃A⊆Aα(pi·A)∈Πα.
The set Πα consists of all the partial traces that the processes and channels can
jointly engage in. Note that, because processes and channels are consistent, Πα con-
tains at least the empty segment. Because the intersection ofAwith the alphabet of any
process or channel can be empty, being progress-enabled does not require all parties to
actually perform an action. The set A itself can be empty and, indeed, the ARN can
‘stutter’ forever if its processes and channels have no requirements to perform actions.
By itself, being progress-enabled does not guarantee that an ARN is consistent:
moving from finite to infinite behaviours requires the analysis of what happens ‘at
the limit’. A progress-enabled but inconsistent ARN guarantees that all the processes
will happily make joint progress but at least one will be prevented from achieving a
successful full trace at the limit. For example, consider the following two processes: P
recurrently sends a given message m and Q is able to receive a message n but only a
finite, though arbitrary, number of times. If these processes are interconnected through
a reliable channel that ensures the delivery of n every time m is published, it is easy
to conclude that the resulting ARN is not consistent in spite of being progress-enabled:
after having engaged in any joint partial trace, both processes and the channel can
proceed (Q will let the channel deliver n one more time if necessary); however, they
are not able to generate a full joint trace because P will want to send m an infinite
number of times and Q will not allow the channel to deliver n infinitely often.
A class of progress-enabled ARNs for which we can guarantee consistency are
those that involve only closed (safety) properties (cf. Def. 2.2). The rationale is that,
by choosing to work with safety properties, ‘success’ does not need to be measured at
the limit: checking the ability to make ‘good’ progress is enough.
From a methodological point of view, considering ARNs that consist of safety prop-
erties is justified by the fact that, within SOC, we are interested in processes whose live-
ness properties are bounded (bounded liveness being itself a safety property). This is
because, in typical business applications, one is interested only in services that respond
within a fixed (probably negotiated) delay. In SOC, one does not offer as a service the
kind of systems that, like operating systems, are not meant to terminate2.
1Progress properties of this kind have been studied, for example, for communicating finite-state machines
[13, 38].
2Cloud computing does offer platform or infrastructure as a service, but this is not what is normally meant
by SOC — software as a service.
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Definition 2.15 (Safe processes, channels and ARNs). A process 〈γ,Λ〉 (resp. channel
〈M,Λ〉) is said to be safe if Λ is closed. A safe ARN is one that is labelled with safe
processes and channels.
Proposition 2.16. For every safe ARN α, Λα is a closed (safety) property.
Proof. Λα is the intersection of the images of the properties of the processes and chan-
nels associated with the nodes and edges of the graph. According to Prop. 2.4, those
images are safety properties. The result follows from the fact that an intersection of
closed sets in any topology is itself a closed set.
We can now prove one of the major results of this paper.
Theorem 2.17 (Consistency). Any safe progress-enabled ARN is consistent.
Proof. Given that the processes and channels in a safe ARN are consistent, Πα is not
empty (it contains at least the empty segment ). Πα can be organised as a tree, which
is finitely branching because Aα is finite. If the ARN is progress-enabled, the tree is
infinite. By Ko˝nigs lemma, it contains an infinite branch λ.
We now prove that λ∈Λα, i.e., λ|ιp∈Λp for all p∈P and λ|ιc∈Λc for all c∈C:
1. Let p∈P and pi ≺ λ|ιp . We know that pi is of the form pi′|ιp where pi′∈Πα.
Therefore, pi∈Λfp .
2. It follows that λ|ιp∈Λp.
3. Because Λp is closed, we can conclude that λ|ιp∈Λp.
4. The same reasoning applies to all channels.
It is not difficult to see that any atomic ARN νP , where P is a process such as
Clerk, is progress-enabled. This is because the process is taken in isolation. For com-
municating finite-state machines, the problem of whether any arbitrary pair of machines
is able to communicate indefinitely is known to be undecidable but approaches exist to
bypass this problem [13, 37, 38]. In the next subsection, we analyse the composition
of ARNs and give sufficient conditions for the composition of progress-enabled ARNs
to be progress-enabled, which effectively guarantees that ARNs are progress-enabled
by construction.
2.4. Composing ARNs
We consider now the composition operation of our component algebra. Two ARNs
can be composed through the ports that are still available for establishing further inter-
connections, i.e., not connected to any other port, which we call interaction-points:
Definition 2.18 (Interaction-point). An interaction-point of an ARN α = 〈P,C, γ,Λ〉
is a pair 〈p,M〉 such that p∈P , M∈γp and there is no edge {p, q}∈C labelled with a
connection that involves M . We denote by Iα the collection of interaction-points of α.
For example, the ARN depicted in Fig. 2 has a single interaction point, which is
represented by projecting the corresponding port to the external box.
Interaction-points are used in the operation of composition that we define for ARNs,
which subsumes the notion of interconnect of [18]:
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Proposition and Definition 2.19 (Composition of ARNs). Let α1 = 〈P1, C1, γ1,Λ1〉
and α2 = 〈P2, C2, γ2,Λ2〉 be ARNs such that P1 and P2 are disjoint, and a fam-
ily wi = 〈M i1 µ
i
1←− M i µ
i
2−→ M i2,Λi〉 (i = 1 . . . n) of connections for interaction-points
〈pi1,M i1〉 of α1 and 〈pi2,M i2〉 of α2 such that, for every i 6= j:
• pi1 6= pj1 or pi2 6= pj2,
• if pi1 = pj1 then M i1 6= M j1 ,
• if pi2 = pj2 then M i2 6= M j2 .
The composition (α1
ni=1...n
〈pi1,Mi1〉,wi,〈pi2,Mi2〉
α2) is the ARN defined as follows:
• Its graph is 〈P1 ∪ P2, C1 ∪ C2 ∪
⋃
i=1...n{pi1, pi2}〉
• Its labelling function coincides with that of α1 and α2 on the corresponding
subgraphs, and assigns to the new edges {pi1, pi2} the label wi.
Proof. We need to prove that the composition does define an ARN. This is because we
are adding to the sum of the graphs edges between interaction-points that do not share
interaction-points, so the resulting graph is simple. It is easy to check that the labels
are well defined.
Fig. 2 can also be used to illustrate the composition of ARNs: the depicted ARN is
the composition of the two atomic ARNs defined by Clerk and RiskEvaluator .
An important property of ARN composition is:
Proposition 2.20. Let α be a composition of two ARNs as in Def. 2.19. Let ι1 be the
inclusion of Aα1 in Aα, ι2 the inclusion of Aα2 in Aα, and ιci the inclusion of AMci in
Aα where ci is the channel involved in wi. Then,
Λα = ι1(Λα1) ∩ ι2(Λα2) ∩
⋂
i=1...n
ιci(Λ
i)
Proof. The results follows from the definition of Λα given in Def. 2.11.
We consider now the question of ascertaining that the composition of two consistent
ARNs is consistent. In SOC, composition of ARNs occurs at run time as applications
discover and bind to applications that offer required services. Therefore, checking for
consistency by checking directly that the set of traces generated by the composition
is not empty (which could be done, as already mentioned, over the product of the
automata that implement the processes and channels) is not feasible. Instead, we would
like to find criteria over the ARNs and the channels that guarantee consistency of the
composition and can be checked at design time.
We start by identifying criteria for the composition of two progress-enabled ARNs
to be progress-enabled. For this purpose, an important property of an ARN relative
to its set of interaction-points is that it does not constrain the actions that do not ‘be-
long’ to the ARN. Naturally, this needs to be understood in terms of a computational
and communication model in which it is clear what dependencies exist between the
different parties. Taking it to be the responsibility of processes to publish and process
messages, and of channels to deliver them, we are interested in processes that are able
to buffer incoming messages, i.e., are ‘delivery-enabled’, and channels that are able
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to buffer published messages, i.e., are ‘publication-enabled’. Note that processes are
nevertheless free to discard delivered messages and channels not to deliver published
messages.
Definition 2.21 (Delivery-enabled ARN). Let α=〈P,C, γ,Λ〉 be an ARN, 〈p,M〉∈Iα
one of its interaction-points, and D〈p,M〉={p.m¡:m∈M+}. We say that α is delivery-
enabled in relation to 〈p,M〉 if, for every (pi·A)∈Πα and B⊆D〈p,M〉, we have that
(pi·B ∪ (A\D〈p,M〉))∈Πα.
That is, being delivery-enabled at an interaction point requires that any joint prefix
of the ARN (see Def. 2.14 for Πα) can be extended by any set of messages delivered
at that interaction-point. Notice that this does not interfere with the decision of the
process to publish messages: B∪(A\D〈p,M〉)) retains all the publications present in
A.
Consider, for example, a process P with a single port with an incoming message n
and an outgoing messagem. If the process P ensures the publication ofm immediately
after the delivery of the first n and does not publish m in any other situation, then its
set of behaviors can be expressed as
∅∗ · ({n¡} · {m!}+ {n¡} · {m!, n¡}+ ∅) · (∅+ {n¡})ω
It is easy to see that the atomic ARN defined by P is delivery-enabled in relation to its
interaction-point.
Definition 2.22 (Publication-enabled channel). Let h=〈M,Λ〉 be a channel and Eh =
{m!:m∈M}. We say that h is publication-enabled iff, for every (pi·A)∈Λf andB⊆Eh,
we have that pi·(B∪(A\Eh))∈Λf .
The requirement here is that any prefix can be extended by the publication of any set
of messages, i.e., the channel should not prevent processes from publishing messages
when they are in a state in which they could do so. Notice that this does not interfere
with the decision of the channel to deliver messages: (B∪(A\Eh)) retains all the
deliveries present in A.
Consider, for example, a channel with a singleton set of messages {n}. If the
channel ensures the delivery of n immediately after its publication in the channel, then
its set of behaviors corresponds to the language of the Bu¨cchi automaton presented in
Fig. 3. It is easy to see that this channel is publication-enabled.
n¡
n!
n!,n¡∅
Figure 3: The behaviour of a publication-enabled channel.
We can now prove our main composition result:
Theorem 2.23. Let α be a composition of progress-enabled ARNs through the connec-
tions wi = 〈M i1 µ
i
1←−M i µ
i
2−→M i2,Λi〉, i = 1 . . . n, i.e.,
α = (α1
ni=1...n
〈pi1,Mi1〉,wi,〈pi2,Mi2〉
α2)
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If, for each i=1. . . n, α1 is delivery-enabled in relation to 〈pi1,M i1〉, α2 is delivery-
enabled in relation to 〈pi2,M i2〉 and hi=〈M i,Λi〉 is publication-enabled, then α is
progress-enabled.
Proof. To simplify the notation, we consider the case of a single pair of interaction
points — α = (α1
f
〈p,M1〉,w,〈q,M2〉 α2) is a composition of progress-enabled ARNs
where w = 〈M1 µ1←− M µ2−→ M2,Λ〉, α1 is delivery-enabled in relation to 〈p,M1〉, α2
is delivery-enabled in relation to 〈q,M2〉 and h = 〈M,Λ〉 is publication-enabled. We
prove that α is progress-enabled.
Let c = {p, q}, pi∈Πα and pi1, pi2 and pic be the corresponding projections to the
languages of α1, α2 and AM , respectively. Let Πc denote Λf , the set of prefixes of the
traces of the channel h that labels the edge c.
We know that pi1∈Πα1 , pi2∈Πα2 and pic∈Πc. Because α1 and α2 are progress-
enabled, let (pi1·B1)∈Πα1 and (pi2·B2)∈Πα2 . Let also (pic·Bc)∈Πc. The addition of
the new edge c only interferes with the ability of p and q to move — the language
ιc(AM ) only intersects those of the two interaction-points. Therefore, we need to
adjust the deliveries in B1 and B2 with the intersection of µ1(Bc) with D〈p,M1〉 and
of µ2(Bc) with D〈q,M2〉, respectively — the deliveries made by the channel — and Bc
with the intersection of µ−11 (B1)∪µ−12 (B2) with Eh — the publications made into the
channel.
Let Bp=µ1(Bc)∩D〈p,M1〉 and Bq=µ2(Bc)∩D〈q,M2〉:
• Let B′1=Bp ∪ (B1\D〈p,M1〉)). Then, (pi1·B′1)∈Πα1 because α1 is delivery-
enabled in relation to 〈p,M1〉— that is, α1 progresses by the deliveries made by
c and the publications made by B1.
• Let B′2=Bq ∪ (B2\D〈q,M2〉)). Then, (pi2·B′2)∈Πα2 because α2 is delivery-
enabled in relation to 〈q,M2〉— that is, α2 progresses by the deliveries made by
c and the publications made by B2.
• LetB′c = (µ−11 (B1)∪µ−12 (B2))∩Eh. Then, (pic·(µ−11 (Bp)∪µ−12 (Bq)∪B′c))∈Πc
because h is publication-enabled, i.e., the channel progresses by the deliveries
made by Bc and the publications made by B1 and B2. Note that because µ1 and
µ2 are injective, (Bc\Eh)=(µ−11 (Bp)∪µ−12 (Bq)).
We can now conclude that (pi·(ι1(B′1)∪ι2(B′2)∪ιc(B′c)))∈Πα.
Because the composition of safe ARNs through safe channels is safe, Theorem 2.23
can be generalised to guarantee consistency of composition:
Corollary 2.24 (Consistency of composition). The composition of safe progress-enabled
ARNs is both safe and progress-enabled (and, hence, consistent) provided that inter-
connections are made through safe publication-enabled channels and over interaction-
points in relation to which the ARNs are delivery-enabled.
Another useful result is that checking whether an ARN is delivery-enabled in rela-
tion to an interaction-point can be reduced to checking that the process that owns the
interaction-point, as an atomic ARN, is delivery-enabled.
Proposition 2.25. Let α be the composition of two ARNs α1 and α2 through the con-
nections wi = 〈M i1 µ
i
1←−M i µ
i
2−→M i2,Λi〉, i = 1 . . . n.
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• Let 〈p′1,M ′1〉 be an interaction-point of α1 that is not one of the 〈pi1,M i1〉. If α1
is delivery-enabled in relation to 〈p′1,M ′1〉, so is α.
• Let 〈p′2,M ′2〉 be an interaction-point of α2 that is not one of the 〈pi2,M i2〉. If α2
is delivery-enabled in relation to 〈p′2,M ′2〉, so is α.
Therefore, the proof that an ARN is progress-enabled can be reduced to checking
that individual processes are delivery-enabled in relation to their interaction points and
that the channels used for composition are publication-enabled. That is, all the check-
ing can be done at design time, not necessarily at composition time (which, in SOC,
takes place at run time).
In order to consider the complexity of checking these properties, we need to con-
sider implementation models for processes and channels. Typical examples of models
are finite automata of some kind. For automata that enforce a syntactic distinction
between input and output actions (i.e., between actions generated by the environment
or by the automata), the notions of delivery/publication-enabled are subsumed by the
property of being input-enabled, taking that publications are inputs for channels and
deliveries are inputs for processes. For example, I/O automata [43] are, by definition,
input-enabled.
Consider, however, the more general class of non-deterministic Bu¨cchi automata
(NBAs) [54]. An NBA over an alphabet A is a tuple of the form 〈Q, δ,Q0, Q∞〉 where
Q is a finite set of states, Q0 ⊆ Q is the subset of initial states, Q∞ ⊆ Q is the set of
accepting states, and δ : Q × A → 2Q is the transition relation. The property defined
by 〈Q, δ,Q0, Q∞〉 is the set of infinite sequences of elements of A that, starting in an
initial state, generate a run that visits at least one of the accepting states infinitely often.
In relation to safety properties, there is also a closure operator on NBAs [3]: the
closure of 〈Q, δ,Q0, Q∞〉 is 〈Q, δ,Q0, Q〉, i.e., the NBA obtained by making all states
accepting. A reduced NBA (i.e., one of which every state leads to an accepting state)
defines a safety property if and only if its closure defines the same property. Further-
more, every NBA is equivalent to a reduced one.
Therefore, given that we are interested in working with safe processes and chan-
nels, we can choose closed reduced NBAs as models of their implementations. In this
case, it is easy to see that all that needs to be checked for processes (resp. channels) to
be delivery (resp. publication) enabled is that, from every state of the automata that im-
plement them, the set of transitions from that state satisfies the corresponding property,
i.e., for every set of deliveries (resp. publications), there is a transition that delivers
(resp. publishes) exactly those messages. As a result, the complexity of the checking
process is in the order of (|Q| ×m× 22×m) where m is the size of the largest port of
the ARN.
From a methodological point of view, ensuring that processes are delivery-enabled
comes ‘naturally’: on the one hand, it is a matter of ensuring that, no matter what state
the process is in, deliveries are not refused – this can be achieved, for example, by
letting each process have its own buffer for incoming messages; on the other hand, it
is a matter of ensuring independence of outputs in relation to inputs received during
the same step – for example, forbidding synchronisation between inputs into the de-
livery buffer and outputs (publication). Notice that processes can be programmed to
discard certain inputs (deliveries) on given states – unless explicitly required, to do so,
processes can discard deliveries.
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2.5. Abstraction
One question that arises quite naturally is whether, by forgetting its internal struc-
ture, an ARN could be seen as a process – an abstraction mechanism useful in system
design. For example, in the example of the composition of Clerk and RiskEvaluator
(see Fig. 2), this would be a process that would have Lc as its only port and whose
behaviour would be that of the ARN translated back to the language of Lc.
When considering an ARN as a process, its ports should be, intuitively, the inter-
action points, i.e., those ports of the processes that are still available for establishing
further interconnections.
Definition 2.26 (Process defined by an ARN). Let α be a consistent ARN. We define
the process Pα as follows:
• Its set of ports γα consists of the ports p.M where 〈p,M〉 is an interaction point
of α.
• Its behaviour consists of the projection of Λα onto the language of Aγα , i.e.,
Λα|Aγα .
Notice that α being consistent, Λα|Aγα is not empty and, therefore, Pα is indeed
a process. Also note that we need to apply the translations p. to the ports of the
interaction points to ensure that γα consists of mutually-disjoint points as required in
Def. 2.7. In practice, we can omit these translations if the original ports are disjoint.
We consider now a relationship of abstraction between two ARNs. First, we con-
sider abstraction between processes:
Definition 2.27 (Process morphism). A morphism between two processes 〈γ1,Λ1〉 and
〈γ2,Λ2〉 consists of
• A function σ : γ1 → γ2.
• For every M∈γ1, a polarity-preserving function σM :M→σ(M), i.e., σM maps
M+ to σ(M)+ and M− to σ(M)−.
such that Λ2|σ∗⊆Λ1 where by σ∗ we denote the translation between Aγ1 and Aγ2
defined by: for every M∈γ1 and m∈M , σ∗(m!)=σM (m)! and mutatis mutandis for
m¡.
Two processes are said to be isomorphic if there is a morphism between them that
is bijective and whose inverse is also a morphism.
For simplicity, we use σ to denote σ∗ and also the morphism 〈σ, {σM : M∈γ1}〉.
Isomorphic processes are equal up to a renaming of their alphabets. An example is,
for every process Q, the process PνQ defined by the atomic ARN that consists of Q.
To capture abstraction, we are particularly interested in the process morphisms
where the map between the set of ports is injective and each map between two ports is
also injective — in the abstract process we can forget ports and we can forget messages
within ports of the concrete process, but we cannot split ports or duplicate messages of
the concrete process. We call such morphisms injective.
Process morphisms can be generalised to a relationship of abstraction between
ARNs as follows:
Definition 2.28 (Abstraction for ARNs). An abstraction of an ARN β consists of
• an ARN α,
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• an injective morphism ρ:Pα→Pβ between the processes defined by the two ARNs,
i.e., Λβ |ρ ⊆ Λα.
That is, the abstraction may remove some interaction-points of β and some of the
messages of those interaction-points, and it preserves the behaviour of β over the re-
maining alphabet of messages. In other words, abstraction is a relationship between
the behaviours that can be observed at the interaction-points of the two ARNs.
We write β ρ α to indicate that α is an abstraction of β, or just β  α when we
do not want to refer to the abstraction morphism. The abstraction relation thus defined
is reflexive (the identity is an abstraction) and transitive (abstractions compose).
This notion of abstraction is compositional in the following sense:
Theorem 2.29 (Compositionality of abstraction). Given a composition
β = (β1
n
〈p1,M1〉,w,〈p2,M2〉
β2)
with w = 〈M1 µ1←−M µ2−→M2,Λ〉, and
α = (α1
n
〈p′1,M ′1〉,w′,〈p2,M2〉
β2)
where β1ρα1, 〈p1,M1〉=ρ(〈p′1,M ′1〉) and w′=〈M1 ρ
−1◦µ1←−−−− µ−11 (ρ(M ′1)) µ2−→M2,Λ〉,
then
(β ρ′ α)
where ρ′ coincides with ρ on Iα\〈p′1,M ′1〉 and with the identity on Iβ2\〈p2,M2〉.
Proof. See Fig. 4 for the context of the proof. We start by noticing that ρ′ is well
defined and injective. The result follows from Prop. 2.20 and the fact that, because
β1 ρ α1, Λβ1 |ρ ⊆ Λα1 .
That is, in a composition of two ARNs, if we replace a component by one of its
abstractions, the resulting composition is an abstraction of the original one. Notice
that, because ρ is not necessarily surjective, w′ may make fewer connections than w.
The definition can be easily generalised to compositions via multiple connections.
p2
βMβ 21
p1
ρρ≼
α
p'1
1
μ1
M'1
Figure 4: The context of Theorem 2.29.
Another important construction is the one through which we can observe the be-
haviour of an ARN through one of its interaction points:
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Definition 2.30 (Process defined by an interaction point). Let α be a consistent ARN
and 〈p,M〉 one of its interaction points. We define the process Pα,p,M as follows:
• Its only port is M .
• Its behaviour is Λα|ια,p,M where ια,p,M is the inclusion of AM in Aα, i.e., the
projection of Λα onto the language of AM .
That is, we project Λα onto the language of p.Aγp , then we remove the prefix p,
and then the actions not in AM .
Proposition 2.31. Let α1 = 〈P1, C1, γ1,Λ1〉 and α2 = 〈P2, C2, γ2,Λ2〉 be two con-
sistent ARNs such that P1 and P2 are disjoint. Let w = 〈M1 µ1←− M µ2−→ M2,Λ〉 be a
connection for interaction-points 〈p1,M1〉 of α1 and 〈p2,M2〉 of α2. Let
α = (α1
n
〈p1,M1〉,w,〈p2,M2〉
α2) and β = (α1
n
〈p1,M1〉,w,〈p2,M2〉
Pα2,p2,M2)
i.e., β is the composition of α1 with the atomic ARN that consists of the single node p2
labelled with the process Pα2,p2,M2 through the same connection w — i.e., we replace
α2 in α with the process that it defines for 〈p2,M2〉.
Then,
1. α  β
2. Given any interaction-point 〈p,M〉 of α1 such that p1 6= p, Pα,p,M = Pβ,p,M
— i.e., Λα|ια,p,M = Λβ |ιβ,p,M
Proof. Tedious.
That is, in a composition of two ARNs, if we replace a component by the process
that it defines at the interconnection point, the resulting composition is an abstraction of
the original one. The second property further tells us that, for the purpose of observing
the behaviour of α in relation to an interaction-point of α1 other than the one used in
the interconnection, only the behaviour that α2 displays at the interconnection point is
relevant.
Proposition 2.32. Let α be a consistent ARN and 〈p,M〉 one of its interaction points.
If β ρ α and ρ(〈p,M〉) is an interaction point of β, then ρM is a process morphism
Pα,p,M → Pβ,ρ(〈p,M〉).
3. The interface algebra
In this section, we put forward a notion of interface for software components de-
scribed in terms of ARNs and a notion of interface composition that is suitable for
service-oriented design. As discussed in Section 1, this means that interfaces need to
specify the services that customers can expect from ARNs as well as the dependen-
cies that the ARNs may have on external services for providing the services that they
offer. Therefore, our notion of service interface consists of a provides-point (offering
properties to customers) and a collection of requires-points, each of which specifies
the properties of an external service that may be required and of the channel through
which the external service will be connected. At the level of interfaces, properties (of-
fered and required) are specified through logical formulas: in Section 3.1, we define
the general properties that are required of a specification logic, of which we then give
an example in Section 3.5.
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We then define, in Section 3.2, what it means for an ARN to orchestrate an interface
and discuss the problem of ensuring that orchestrations are well defined, i.e., that when
interconnected with orchestrations of required services, the resulting composition is
consistent and delivers the properties offered at the provides-point.
Two operations over interfaces are defined: composition in Section 3.3, and re-
finement in Section 3.4. Composition takes two interfaces and a match between a
requires-point of one of the interfaces (the client) and the provides-point of the other
(the supplier) – the properties provided by the supplier entail those required by the
client. Refinement strengthens the properties offered at the provides-point and weakens
those of the requires-points. Refinement is then shown to be compositional in relation
to the composition operation. Finally, we show that orchestrations are compositional
in relation to both the composition and refinement of interfaces.
3.1. Specifications
In [18], predicates are used as a means of describing properties of input/output be-
haviour, i.e., establishing relations (or the lack thereof) between inputs and outputs of
processes, leading to several classes of relational nets depending on when they are con-
sidered to be ‘well-formed’. In the context of our asynchronous communication model,
behaviour is observed in terms of the actions that are performed over the lifetime of the
process, for which the natural formalism to use is temporal logic, namely some form
of linear temporal logic given that behaviours are defined in terms of infinite sequences
of actions.
Rather than propose one specific logic, it seems to be more useful to identify the
properties that would make a logic suitable for the description of the kind of networks
with which we are concerned. Some of these properties concern the ability to relate
specifications over alphabets related by a map, namely to relate the logical properties
of processes with those of the networks in which they execute.
Definition 3.1 (Specification logic). A specification logic maps:
• every alphabet A to a set ΩA (of sentences) and a (satisfaction) relation A
between traces and sentences
– Given a property Λ, we write Λ A φ to mean that λ A φ for every λ∈Λ,
in which case we say that Λ is a model of (or validates) φ
– Given Φ⊆ΩA, we write Λ A Φ to mean that Λ A φ for every φ∈Φ
– Given Φ⊆ΩA, we denote by ΛΦ the set of traces λ such that λ A Φ
• every function σ:A→B between alphabets to a function Ωσ:ΩA→ΩB that trans-
lates sentences over A to sentences over B such that, for every trace λB in B
and sentence φA∈ΩA,
(1) λB B Ωσ(φA) iff λB |σ A φA
We call a specification a pair 〈A,Φ〉 where A is an alphabet and Φ is a finite set of
sentences in ΩA.
For simplicity, we tend to use σ(φ) as an abbreviation of Ωσ(φ).
Equation (1) means that the satisfaction relation is independent of the alphabet, i.e.,
that the specific choice of actions does not interfere with the logical properties of the
satisfaction relation.
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Proposition 3.2 (Algebraic properties of specification logics). Specification logics de-
fine institutions [36]. The following definitions and properties apply to all institutions.
Let A be an alphabet and σ:A→B a map.
1. A extends to sets of sentences Φ over A as follows: Φ A φ iff, for every trace
λ over A, if λ A φ′ for all φ′∈Φ, then λ A φ.
2. Λ A Φ iff Λ ⊆ ΛΦ
3. For every set Φ of sentences over A and sentence φ, if Φ A φ then σ(Φ) B
σ(φ).
Definition 3.3 (Process defined by a specification). Let γ be a set of mutually dis-
joint ports and Φ a consistent set of sentences over Aγ . The process defined by the
specification 〈Aγ ,Φ〉 is 〈γ,ΛΦ〉.
Definition 3.4 (Processes and ARNs as models). The process 〈γ,Λ〉 is a model of (or
validates) the specification 〈A,Φ〉 via the alphabet map σ:A→Aγ , which we denote by
〈γ,Λ〉 σ Φ, iff Λ|σ  Φ — i.e., σ is a process morphism 〈γ,ΛΦ〉 → 〈γ,Λ〉.
An ARN α is a model of (or validates) the specification 〈A,Φ〉 via the alphabet map
σ:A→Aγα , which we denote by α σ Φ, iff Pα σ Φ.
Proposition 3.5. The following properties follow immediately from the definition:
• If ρ:P1→P2 is a process morphism and P1 σ Φ then P2 ρ◦σ Φ.
• If β ρ α and α σ Φ then β ρ◦σ Φ.
We defer the discussion of choosing a specification logic to Sect. 3.5 and, for
the rest of this section, we assume a fixed specification logic. Naturally, it would
be important to show that at least one such logic exists. A simple example is linear
temporal logic (LTL) [44]: a proof that LTL is an institution can be found in [24].
However, as discussed below, LTL is not necessarily the most suitable logic for defining
an interface theory for safe ARNs.
3.2. Service interfaces and their orchestrations
In our model, a service interface identifies a number of ports through which services
are provided and ports through which services are required (hence the importance of
ports for correlating messages that belong together from a business point of view).
Sentences of the specification logic are used for specifying the properties offered or
required.
Ports for required services include messages as sent or received by the external
service. Therefore, to complete the interface we need to be able to express requirements
on the channel through which communication with the external service will take place,
if and when required. In order to express those properties, we need to have actions on
both sides of the channel, for which we introduce the notion of dual port.
Definition 3.6 (Dual port). Given a port M , we denote by Mop the port defined by
Mop+ = M− and Mop− = M+.
Definition 3.7 (Service interface). A service interface i consists of:
• A set I (of interface-points) partitioned into a singleton set {i→} and a set I←
the members of which are called the provides- and requires-points, respectively.
• For every r∈I ,
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– a port Mr,
– a consistent set of formulas Φr over AMr .
• For every point r∈I←, a consistent set of formulas Ψr over AMr ∪AMopr .
We identify an interface with the tuple 〈i→, I←,M,Φ,Ψ〉whereMr:r∈I , Φr:r∈I ,
Ψr:r∈I← are the indexed families that identify the ports and specifications of each
point of the interface.
In Fig. 5, we present an example of an interface for a credit service using a graph-
ical notation similar to that of SCA. On the left, we have a provides-point Customer
and, on the right, a requires-point IRiskEvaluator .
The set of sentences Φc specifies the service offered at Customer . In the logic
defined in Sect. 3.5, these are:
• (creditReq¡R (creditReq¡ ⊃ 3≤10(approved !∨denied !))) — either approved
or denied are published within ten steps of the first delivery of creditReq .
• (approved ! ⊃ (accept¡ R≤20 (accept¡ ⊃ 3≤2transferDate!))) — if accept
is received within twenty steps of the publication of approved , transferDate
will be published within two steps.
The specification IRiskEvaluator requires the external service to react to the de-
livery of every getRisk by publishing riskValue in no more than four steps:
Φr : (getRisk ¡ ⊃ 3≤4riskValue!)
The channel is specified to be reliable with delay 1:
Ψr : (getRisk ! ⊃ ©getRisk ¡) ∧(riskValue! ⊃ ©riskValue¡)
    
Customer
IRiskEvaluatorIBANKCREDITSERVICE
getRisk
riskValue
getRisk
riskValue Ψ rcreditReqapproved
denied
transferDate
accept
      
Φc
      
Φ r
Figure 5: An example of a service interface.
An ARN orchestrates a service-interface by assigning interaction-points to interface-
points in such a way that the behaviour of the ARN validates the specifications of the
provides-points on the assumption that it is interconnected to ARNs that validate the
specifications of the requires-points through channels that validate the corresponding
specifications.
Definition 3.8 (Orchestration). An orchestration of a service interface 〈i→,I←,M,Φ,Ψ〉
consists of:
• an ARN α = 〈P,C, γ,Λ〉 where P and I are disjoint;
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• an injective function θ: I → Iα that assigns a different interaction-point to each
interface-point; we write r θ−→p to indicate that θ(r) = 〈p,Mp〉 for some port
Mp;
• a polarity-preserving injection θi→ from Mi→ to Mp where i→ θ−→p, which as-
signs to every message of the provides-point a message of the corresponding
interaction-point of the ARN;
• for every requires-point r∈I←, a polarity-preserving injection θr:Mopr →Mq
where r θ−→q, which assigns to every message of the requires-point a message
of the corresponding interaction-point of the ARN — the polarities are reversed
because the requires-point stands for an external service with which the ARN
may be required to connect;
such that Pα∗,θ(i→) θi→ Φi→ where:
• For every requires-point r of I←, αr is the ARN defined by the process 〈{Mr},ΛΦr 〉
and wr the connection 〈Mq θr←−Mr id−→Mr,ΛΨr 〉 where r θ−→q.
• α∗ = (α fr∈I←θ(r),wr,〈r,Mr〉 αr)
That is, Λα∗ |ια∗,θ(i→)◦θi→  Φi→ where i→ θ−→p and ια∗,θ(i→) is the inclusion of AMp
in Aα∗ .
Notice that Pα∗,θ(i→) is the process that abstracts the behaviour of α∗ observed
at the image of the provides-point. The requirement is, therefore, that whenever the
orchestration α is composed with ‘canonical’ implementations of the requires-points
— the processes 〈{Mr},ΛΦr 〉, the resulting ARN validates the provides-point.
We borrow from [18] the notation α θ i to indicate that the ARN α provides,
through the family of mappings θ, an orchestration of the service interface i. Figure 6
summarises the constructions involved in the definition.
α
α
i
α
r1
r2
θr 1θr 2θi⟶
p
idr 2
idr 1
i⟶
r 1
r 2
= Λ Φ r 1
= Λ Φ r 2
= Λ Ψ r 1
= Λ Ψ r 2
Figure 6: α θ i iff the properties in Φi→ are validated by the composition of α with the models of the
specifications of the requires-points.
In order to illustrate the concept, consider again the atomic ARN νClerk , defined by
the process Clerk . As illustrated in Fig. 7, νClerk θ IBANKCREDITSERVICE where
IBANKCREDITSERVICE is the service interface presented before and θ is such that:
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• Customer θ−→〈Clerk , Lc〉 and θCustomer is the identity function;
• IRiskEvaluator θ−→〈Clerk , Rc〉 and θIRiskEvaluator is the identity function.
The property Λc is such that it validates Φc on the assumption that Clerk is inter-
connected through IRiskEvaluator to an ARN that validates Φr via a channel that
validates Ψr.
    
Customer
IRiskEvaluator
Clerk
ΘCustomer Θ IRiskEvaluator
Θ
IBANKCREDITSERVICE
getRisk
riskValue
getRisk
riskValue Ψe
creditReq
approved
denied
transferDate
accept
creditReq
approved
denied
transferDate
accept
getRisk
riskValue
      
Φc
      
Φ r
Lc
Rc
           Λ c
Figure 7: Example of an orchestration: νClerk θ IBANKCREDITSERVICE.
The following result clarifies what we mean by ‘canonical’ and justifies the defini-
tion:
Theorem 3.9 (Canonicity of orchestrations). Let 〈α, θ〉 be an orchestration of an in-
terface i = 〈i→, I←,M i,Φi,Ψi〉. For every requires-point r of I←, let
• βr be an ARN with an interaction point 〈qr,M ′r〉 such that Pβr,qr,M ′r θ′r Φr
where θ′r:Mr→M ′r is a polarity-preserving injection,
• wr be a connection between α and βr via a channel cr=〈Mr,Λr〉 where Λr
validates Ψr and attachments θr, θ′r.
Then, the composition β∗ = (α
fr∈I←
θ(r),wr,〈qr,M ′r〉 βr) satisfies Pβ∗,θ(i→) θi→ Φi→ .
Proof.
• From Pβr,qr,M ′r θ′r Φr, we derive that βr qr. ◦θ′r αr.
• From Theo.2.29, we conclude that β∗ ρ α∗ where ρ is the identity on α and
coincides with (qr. ◦ θ′r) on αr (α and α∗ being as in Def. 3.8).
• From Prop. 2.31, the identity is a process morphism Pα∗,θ(i→) → Pβ∗,θ(i→).
• Because 〈α, θ〉 is an orchestration of i, we know that Pα∗,θ(i→) θi→ Φi→ .
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• From Prop. 3.5 we can then conclude that Pβ∗,θ(i→) θi→ Φi→ .
β
β
i
α
r1
r2
θr 1θr 2θi⟶
p
θ'r 2
θ'r 1
i⟶
r 1
r 2 Λ Φ r 2⊆ 
Λ Φ r 1⊆ Λ Ψ r 1⊆ 
Λ Ψ r 2⊆ 
Figure 8: α θ i iff the properties offered through Φi→ are validated by all compositions of α with ARNs
and via channels that validate the specifications of the requires-points.
Fig. 8 summarises the constructions involved in the proof. The result means that,
no matter what the external services that bind to the requires-points do and how the
channels transmit messages (as long as they satisfy the corresponding specifications),
the ARN will be able to deliver the properties specified in its provides-point.
A property that is often useful in proofs is that the internal structure of the orches-
tration is not relevant:
Proposition 3.10. Given a service interface i and an ARN α, (α θ i) iff (νPα θ i)
where νPα is the atomic ARN consisting of the process defined by α (cf. Def. 2.12).
Proof. Trivial.
Requiring the ARN α∗ to be consistent is also important because an interconnection
that leads to an inconsistent composition would vacuously satisfy any specification
(there would be no behaviours to check against the specification).
Definition 3.11 (Well-defined orchestration). An orchestration α of a service-interface
i is said to be well defined if the ARN α∗ as constructed in Def. 3.8 is consistent. We
use α Jθ i to indicate that α is a well-defined orchestration of i.
Naturally, α itself needs to be consistent to be a well-defined orchestration.
Corollary 2.24 gives us a sufficient condition for checking that an an orchestration
is well defined:
Corollary 3.12. Given a service-interface i = 〈i→,I←,M,Φ,Ψ〉 and an orchestration
(α /θ i), (α Jθ i) if:
1. α is a safe progress-enabled ARN that is delivery-enabled in relation to the im-
ages of the requires-points.
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2. The ARNsαr defined by the processes 〈{Mr},ΛΦr 〉 are safe and delivery-enabled
in relation to {Mr}.
3. The channels 〈Mr,ΛΨr 〉 are safe and publication-enabled.
We defer the discussion on how to ensure points 2 and 3 to Section 3.5.
Likewise, Theorem 3.9 does not guarantee by itself that the resulting ARN β∗ is
consistent. As above, we can guarantee consistency provided that:
1. the orchestration α is safe, progress-enabled and delivery-enabled in relation to
the interaction-points that correspond to the requires-points;
2. the ARNs βr that implement the specifications of the requires-points are consis-
tent, safe, progress-enabled and delivery-enabled in relation to the interaction-
points through which they connect to α;
3. the channels involved are safe and publication-enabled.
Another corollary concerns orchestrations defined through specifications:
Corollary 3.13. Let i = 〈i→,I←,M,Φ,Ψ〉 be a service-interface such that all ports
are mutually disjoint. Let 〈A,Γ〉 be a specification such that its alphabet A includes
AMi→ and all the AMr where r∈I←. Let iα = 〈{Mopr : r∈I←}∪{Mi→},ΛΓ〉 be the
ARN consisting of a single process whose ports are those of the interface-points and
whose behaviour is generated by the set Γ of sentences (cf. Def 3.1).
• If (Γ ∪⋃r∈I← Φr ∪⋃r∈I← Ψr)  Φi→ then (iα id i) (iα is an orchestration
of i).
• If in addition (Γ ∪⋃r∈I← Φr ∪⋃r∈I← Ψr) is consistent, (iα Jid i).
3.3. Composition of service interfaces
We now turn our attention to the composition of interfaces, an essential ingredient
of any interface algebra.
Definition 3.14 (Match). A match between two interfaces i = 〈i→, I←,M i,Φi,Ψi〉
and j = 〈j→, J←,M j ,Φj ,Ψj〉 is a pair 〈r, δ〉 where r∈I← and δ:M ir→M jj→ is a
polarity-preserving injection such that Φjj→ |= δ(Φir). Two interfaces are said to be
compatible if their sets of interface-points are disjoint and admit a match.
That is, a match maps a requires-point of one of the interfaces to the provides-point
of the other in such a way that the required properties are entailed by the provided ones.
Notice that, because the identity of the interface-points is immaterial, requiring that the
sets of points of the interfaces be disjoint is not restrictive at all. We typically use δ:r
to refer to a match.
Definition 3.15 (Composition of interfaces). Given a match δ:r between compatible
interfaces i and j, their composition (i ‖δ:r j) is 〈i→,K←,M,Φ,Ψ〉 where:
• K← = J← ∪ (I← \ {r}).
• 〈M,Φ,Ψ〉 coincides with 〈M i,Φi,Ψi〉 and 〈M j ,Φj ,Ψj〉 on the corresponding
interface-points.
Notice that the composition of interfaces is not commutative: one of the interfaces
(on the left) plays the role of client and the other (on the right) of supplier of services.
We can now prove compositionality, i.e., that the composition of the orchestrations
of compatible interfaces is an orchestration of the composition of the interfaces.
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i
r j
 
δ
r3
r2
i⟶ j⟶
i || j
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r3
δ:r
i⟶
Figure 9: Match between interfaces i and j and the interface that results from their composition.
Theorem 3.16 (Composition of orchestrations). Let i = 〈i→, I←,M i,Φi,Ψi〉 and
j = 〈j→, J←,M j ,Φj ,Ψj〉 be compatible interfaces, δ:r a match between them, 〈α, θ〉
and 〈β, σ〉 orchestrations of i and j, respectively, with disjoint graphs, and 〈Mr,Λ〉 a
channel such that Λ |= Ψir. Then,
(α
n
θ(r),w,σ(j→)
β)κ (i ‖δ:r j)
where κ coincides with θ on I and with σ on J , w = 〈Mp θr←− Mr σj→ ◦ δ−−−−→ Mq,Λ〉,
θ(r)=〈p,Mp〉 and σ(j→) = 〈q,Mq〉.
Proof. We start by noticing that κ is an injection because we assumed that α and β
have disjoint graphs. Let (α ‖ β)∗ be the ARN constructed as in Def. 3.8
( (α
n
〈p,Mp〉,w,〈q,Mq〉
β)
t∈K←n
κ(t),wt,〈t,Mt〉
γt)
i.e., the ARNs γt are the models of the specifications of the requires-points t ∈ K←.
We now prove that (α ‖ β)∗ validates the provides-point:
• Because 〈β, σ〉 is an orchestration of j, Pβ∗,σ(j→) σj→ Φjj→ .
• We also know that, because δ:r is a match, Φjj→ |= δ(Φir).
Therefore, Pβ∗,σ(j→) δ◦σj→ Φir.
• By applying Theo. 3.9 to α and the family βt, t∈I←, of ARNs defined by
– βr = β∗ = (β
ft∈J←
σ(t),wt,〈t,Mt〉 γt)
– βt = γt for t 6= r
we can conclude that P(α‖β)∗,θ(i→) θi→ Φii→
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Figure 10: The context of Theorem 3.16.
Notice that the proof essentially rearranges the ARN (α ‖ β)∗ as a composition of
α with the models of the specifications of its requires-points except for r where we use
β∗, which we know is a model of Φr.
Compositionality is one of the key properties required in [18] for a suitable notion
of interface. From the software engineering point of view, it means that there is indeed
a separation between interfaces and their implementations in the sense that composition
can be performed at the interface level independently of the way the interfaces will be
implemented.
Well-definedness of the composition can be guaranteed as follows:
Theorem 3.17 (Composition of orchestrations). In the circumstances of Theorem 3.16,
if
• (α Jθ i) and (β Jσ j),
• α is safe, progress-enabled and delivery-enabled in relation to θ(r),
• β is safe, progress-enabled and delivery-enabled in relation to σ(j→),
• 〈Mr,ΛΨiMr 〉 is publication-enabled
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then
(α
n
θ(r),w,σ(j→)
β) Jκ (i ‖δ:r j)
It follows from this result that, if a match is established between the interface of
a service i and the interface of another service j, any orchestrations of i and j that
fulfil the stated conditions will work properly together at run time (i.e., there will be no
interaction errors).
In Fig. 11 we illustrate the composition of the orchestrations
νClerk θ IBANKCREDITSERVICE
νRiskEvaluator κ IRISKEVALSERVICE
where IRISKEVALSERVICE is an interface with provides-point RECustomer whose
set of properties Φe includes(request¡ ⊃ 3≤3result!). This interface is orchestrated
by the atomic ARN νRiskEvaluator presented before, κRECustomer being the identity.
The matching between the two interfaces is established by the polarity preserving
mapping δ: getRisk 7→ request , riskValue 7→ result . The requirement in Φr trans-
lates through δ to (request¡ ⊃ 3≤4result!), which is trivially entailed by Φe. For
the composition of the two services, we take the channel wce also used in the ARN
presented in Fig. 2, as Λw validates δ(Ψr). The result of this composition, presented at
the bottom of Fig. 11, is an interface with a single interface-point orchestrated by the
ARN presented before.
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Figure 11: The composition of two orchestrations.
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3.4. Refinement of service interfaces
An important ingredient of the theory of component interfaces developed in [18] is
a notion of compositional refinement that applies to interfaces (for top-down design)
and a notion of compositional abstraction for implementations (orchestrations in the
case of services), that can support bottom-up verification. Both notions are based on
a reflexive and transitive binary relation  that, left to right, means refinement and,
right to left, means abstraction. In this section we address refinement that applies to
interfaces while abstraction for orchestrations is as in Section 2.5.
Definition 3.18 (Refinement of interfaces). A refinement of i = 〈i→, I←,M i,Φi,Ψi〉
consists of
• an interface j = 〈j→, J←,M j ,Φj ,Ψj〉
• a bijection ρ between I and J
• a polarity-preserving injection ρi→ : M ii→ →M jj→
• an I←-indexed family of polarity-preserving bijections ρr : M jρ(r) →M ir
such that
• ρ(i→) = j→
• Φjj→ |= ρi→(Φii→),
• Φir |= ρr(Φjρ(r)) for every r ∈ I←,
• Ψir |= ρr(Ψjρ(r)) for every r ∈ I←.
We write j  i to indicate that the interface j refines i, or j ρ i when we want
to make the refinement mapping 〈ρ, {ρr}r∈I〉 explicit. The refinement relation  thus
defined is reflexive and transitive.
Because ρ is a bijection, the number of interface-points of the two service interfaces
are the same: none can be added or removed. This is because, on the one hand, and
following the tradition of ‘don’t ask more’, an orchestration of j cannot rely on more
external services than those required by i, otherwise it would not be able to orchestrate
i. On the other hand, the number of requires-points cannot decrease either: if a ser-
vice interface declares a particular requires-point, this is because it wants to optimise
the provision of the service by procuring an external provider at run time; therefore,
refinement should preserve this decision instead of forcing that external functionality
to be implemented in the orchestration.
Notice that, through refinement, new messages can be added to the provides-point
and more properties can be added (‘don’t offer less’). On the other hand, in relation to
requires-points, refinement can weaken the required properties (‘don’t ask more’), thus
enlarging the space of providers, but it cannot change the required messages.
A fundamental property of refinement is that if j refines i, then any orchestration
of j should also be an orchestration of i.
Theorem 3.19 (Refinement vs implementation). Given interfaces i and j such that j
refines i, every orchestration of j also defines an orchestration of i.
Proof. See Figure 12 for a sketch of the context of the proof. Assume that αθ j and
j ρ i.
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1. We start by defining the mapping θ′ from I to Iα:
• θ′(i→) = θ(j→) and θ′i→ = θj→ ◦ ρi→ where j→ θ−→p.
• For every r∈I←, θ′(r)=θ(ρ(r)) and θ′r=θρ(r) ◦ ρ−1r :M i
op
r →Mp where
ρ(r) θ−→p.
The function θ′ is injective because ρ and θ are injective. Every function θ′r is a
composition of polarity-preserving injections, so it is itself a polarity-preserving
injection.
2. Let α∗i = (α
fr∈I←
θ(r),wir,〈r,Mr〉 α
i
r) where the α
i
r and w
i
r are as in Def. 3.8.
• Because, for every r∈J←, Φir |= ρr(Φjρ(r)) and Ψir |= ρr(Ψjρ(r)), we can
conclude that, for every r∈J←, ΛΦir |ρr |= Φ
j
ρ(r) and ΛΨir |ρr |= Ψ
j
ρ(r).
• Because α θ j and ρ is a bijection between I and J , we are in the condi-
tions of Theo. 3.9 and can conclude that Pα∗i ,θ(j→) θj→ Φ
j
j→ .
• Because Φjj→ |= ρi→(Φii→), we have that Pα∗i ,θ(j→)◦ρi→ θj→◦ρi→ Φii→ .
• Given that θ′i→ = θj→ ◦ ρi→ , we conclude that Pα∗i ,θ′(i→) θ′i→ Φii→ i.e.,
αθ′ i.
j
i
r
ρ
ρ(r)
⊣
⊣
α
p
θ
θj⟶
ρ i⟶ ≼ ρ r
θρ(r)
Figure 12: The context of Theorem 3.19.
Another fundamental property of refinement so that it can support top-down design
(i.e., that an interface i can be refined, iteratively, into an interface j  i) is that the
elements of a composite interface can be refined independently [18], i.e., the refinement
relation  is compositional w.r.t. ‖ in the following sense:
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Theorem 3.20 (Compositional refinement). Let δ : r be a match between service
interfaces i1 and i2. If j1ρ1i1 and j2ρ2i2, then
• ρ2i→2 ◦ δ ◦ ρ1r : ρ1(r)→j
→
2 is a match between j1 and j2
• (j1 ‖ρ2i→2 ◦δ◦ρ1r j2)  (i1 ‖δ i2)
Proof. See Fig. 13 for a sketch of the context of the proof. We start by proving that
ρ2i→2
◦ δ ◦ ρ1r is indeed a match between j1 and j2.
1. Because all the functions involved are polarity-preserving injections, so is their
composition.
2. Because δ is a match between i1 and i2, we know that Φ
i→2
i2
|= δ(Φri1) and, by
Prop. 3.2.3, ρ2i→2 (Φ
i→2
i2
) |= ρ2i→2 (δ(Φ
r
i1
)).
3. Because j2 ρ2 i2, Φρ2(i
→
2 )
j2
|= ρ2i→2 (Φ
i→2
i2
) and, from (2), Φρ2(i
→
2 )
j2
|= ρ2i→2 (δ(Φ
r
i1
)).
4. On the other hand, j1 ρ1 i1 implies that Φri1 |= ρ1r (Φ
ρ1(r)
j1
), which by Prop.
3.2.3 implies ρ2i→2 (δ(Φ
r
i1
)) |= ρ2i→2 (δ(ρ1r (Φ
ρ1(r)
j1
)))
5. Finally, from (3) and (4), Φρ2(i
→
2 )
j2
|= ρ2i→2 (δ(ρ1r (Φ
ρ1(r)
j1
))).
It remains to prove that (j1 ‖ρ2i→2 ◦δ◦ρ1r j2)  (i1 ‖δ i2), which is straightfor-
ward by taking the sum of the refinement mappings ρ1 and ρ2, i.e., the mapping that
coincides with ρ1 on the provides-point and with ρn on the requires-points that remain
from jn (n=1,2).
j
⊣
i
r i
 
δ
ρ1
1
2
1 j2
≼ ≼⊣ ρ2
⊣
ρ
r1
ρ2 i⟶2
Figure 13: The context of Theorem 3.20.
Abstraction is also a way of simplifying the proof that an ARN orchestrates an
interface:
Proposition 3.21 (Abstraction vs orchestration). Given an interface i and an ARN α
such that αθ i, if β ρ α then β θ◦ρ i.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of Proposition 3.5.
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That is, to prove that an ARN orchestrates an interface, it is sufficient to prove
that one of its abstractions is an orchestration of that interface. This result generalises
Proposition 3.10.
3.5. Logics for service interfaces
The results of Sec. 3.2 highlight the importance of choosing specification logics so
that it is possible (and effective) to check whether specifications define safe delivery-
enabled processes or safe publication-enabled channels. As argued in Section 2.3,
working with safety properties is justified by the fact that, within SOC, we are inter-
ested in processes whose liveness properties are bounded (bounded liveness being itself
a safety property).
Several extensions of LTL have been proposed in which one can express different
forms of bounded liveness. For instance, several logics for real-time systems (see [5]
for an early survey) allow one to express eventuality properties of the form 3Iφ where
I is a time interval during which φ is required to become true. Another logic of interest
is PROMPT-LTL [41] in which, instead of a specific bound for the waiting time, one can
simply express that a sentence φwill become true within an unspecified bound —3pφ.
Yet another logic is PLTL [4] in which one can use variables in addition to constants to
express bounds on the waiting time and reason, for example, about the existence of a
bound (or of a minimal bound) for a response time.
The logic we use in this paper, which we call SAFETY-LTL, is a version of PLTL
where intervals are finite and bounded by constants. It can also be seen as a restricted
version of SAFETY-MTL [48] (itself a fragment of Metric Temporal Logic [40]) where,
instead of an explicit model of real-time, we adopt an implicit one in which time is
discrete. An advantage of adopting a discrete-time model (one in which time units
are execution steps) is that we can work directly over (2A)ω without introducing an
explicit space of real-time3. From a methodological point of view, the restriction can
be justified by the fact that, in SOC, one often deals with ‘business’-time where delays
are measured in discrete time units.
Definition 3.22 (SAFETY-LTL). Let A be an alphabet.
• The language of SAFETY-LTL overA is defined by (where a∈A and t is a natural
number – t∈N):
φ ::= a | ¬a | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | ©φ | φR φ | φR≤t φ | φ U≤t φ
• Sentences are interpreted over λ∈(2A)ω as follows :
λ  a iff a∈λ(0)
λ  ¬a iff a/∈λ(0)
λ  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff λ  φ1 and λ  φ2
λ  φ1 ∨ φ2 iff λ  φ1 or λ  φ2
λ ©φ iff λ1  φ
λ  φ1 R φ2 iff, for all j, either λj  φ2 or there exists k<j s.t. λk  φ1
3The choice of a timed semantics – where a time sequence runs along a trace – with topological properties
that allow the results given in this paper to be generalised is not trivial and is discussed in [20].
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λ  φ1 R≤t φ2 iff, for all j≤t, either λj  φ2 or there exists k<j s.t.
λk  φ1
λ  φ1 U≤t φ2 iff there exists j≤t s.t. λj  φ2 and, for all k< j, λk  φ1
• We use the following abbreviations:
a ⊃ φ ≡ ¬a ∨ φ
3≤tφ ≡ true U≤t φ — φ will hold before t time units (or it holds now)
φ ≡ falseR φ — now and forever φ
≤tφ ≡ falseR≤t φ — φ will hold for the next t time units (and now)
Notice that the language is not closed under negation: negation is only available for
atomic propositions (actions) and sentences are in negation normal form.
Theorem 3.23 (Safety). All the sentences of SAFETY-LTL express safety properties,
i.e., for all sentences φ, Λφ is a closed set.
Proof. By a simple induction in the structure of φ.
Corollary 3.24 (Safe specifications). It follows from the previous theorem that all the
specifications over SAFETY-LTL are safe, i.e., for all sets of sentences Φ, ΛΦ is a safety
property.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that the intersection of any number of closed
properties is closed.
As motivated in Section 3.2, in addition to making sure that specifications of pro-
cesses and channels generate safety properties, it is important that developers can guar-
antee that the processes thus defined are delivery-enabled in relation to their ports and
that channels are publication-enabled. Ensuring delivery/publication-enabledness is
not the same as proving that a process/channel satisfies a specification because those
properties are not expressible as sentences whose satisfaction can be checked over indi-
vidual traces: they would need to be checked over sets of traces, for which a branching-
time logic would be required. In the context of a logic like SAFETY-LTL, these proper-
ties can be checked instead over the non-deterministic Bu¨cchi automata that implement
the specifications as explained in Section 2.4.
4. Related Work
In this paper, we proposed a formalisation of ‘services’ as interfaces for an algebra
of asynchronous components inspired by the work reported in [18] on a theory of in-
terfaces for component-based design and our previous work on a modelling language
for service-oriented computing (SRML [33]). That is, we exposed and provided math-
ematical support for the view that services are, at a certain level of abstraction, a way
of using software components — what is sometimes called a ‘service-overlay’ — and
not so much a way of constructing software. This view is consistent with the way
services are being perceived in businesses [22] and supported by architectures such as
SCA [47].
In relation to SRML, this paper abstracts an interface theory for services in the
style [18] from the specific semantic model and specification structures proposed in,
e.g., [30]. That is, SRML offers an instance of such an interface theory and an example
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of how it can be used for modelling services within a methodology that differs from
the more traditional component-based approach in which components expose methods
in their interfaces and bind tightly to each other (based on I/O-relations) to construct
software applications. In our approach, components expose conversational, stateful
interfaces through which they expose services that can be discovered by business ap-
plications or bind, on the fly, to external services. Examples of case studies for different
application domains can be found in [1, 10, 11]. See also [29, 32] for a formalisation
of the dynamic aspects of service discovery and binding, which can be superposed over
the interface theory proposed in this paper.
Our approach also differs from assumption/guarantee (A/G) styles of specifica-
tions, which have been proposed (since [46]) for networks of processes and also used
in [50] for web services. The aim of A/G is to ensure compositionality of specifica-
tions of processes by making explicit assumptions on the way they interact with their
environment. The purpose of the interfaces that we propose is, instead, to specify
the protocols offered to clients of the service and the protocols that the external ser-
vices that the service may need to discover and bind to are required to follow. The
notion of orchestration makes this clear: the purpose of the requires-points is to cre-
ate the environment required by the orchestration to deliver the properties specified
at the provides-point. This is also why our notion of composition of interfaces is not
symmetric: composition of service interfaces reflects the provision of some of the ser-
vices required by one interface (the client) in terms of another interface (the provider).
The notion of composition of A/G specifications is meant instead to reflect the parallel
composition of components and, therefore, is symmetric. In SOC, there is also a notion
of composition (or aggregation) of services through which more complex services can
be provided. In our approach [30], this is achieved by orchestrating the interactions
between the component services and defining a service-interface for the composition
that offers the properties that result from the composition in its provides-interface.
Several formal frameworks have been proposed for SOC, many of which in the
form of process calculi (e.g., [12, 14, 16, 21]) or automata-based models (e.g., [8, 15,
35] for asynchronous models) that address type-theoretical aspects of service contracts.
Such contracts apply to the peers involved in a service choreography – the behaviour
that peers are expected to implement in order to successfully engage with the others
in a choreography – and, as such, are not interfaces for service discovery and binding
through provides/requires-points as we addressed in the paper. Indeed, choreography
models are inherently different from ours in the sense that they study different prob-
lems: the adoption of automata reflects the need to study the properties and realisabil-
ity of conversation protocols captured as words of a language of message exchange. It
would be tempting to draw a parallel between their notion of composite service — a
network of machines — and our ARNs, but they are actually poles apart: our aim has
not been to model the conversations that characterise the global behaviour of the peers
that deliver a service, but to model the network of processes executed by an individual
peer and how that network orchestrates a service interface for that peer — that is, our
approach is orchestration-based. Therefore, we do not make direct usage of automata,
although a reification of our processes could naturally be given in terms of automata.
Different approaches to formalising the compatibility relation between clients and
service providers can also be found in the literature, which are essentially process-
based (e.g., [17] based on CCS and [49] based on Petri-nets). Our usage of logic for
specifying required and provided properties has the advantage of being more abstract
and adopt a more general model of asynchronous communication in which channels
are first-class entities (reflecting the importance that they have in SOC).
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Another notion of web service interface has been proposed in [9]. This work
presents a specific language, not a general approach like we did in this paper, but there
are some more fundamental differences between them, such as the fact that their un-
derlying model of interaction is synchronous (method invocation): as argued in [39],
web-service composition languages such BPEL (the Business Process Execution Lan-
guage [52]) rely on an (asynchronous) message-passing model, which is more adequate
for interactions that need to run in a loosely-coupled operating environment. The un-
derlying approach is, like ours, orchestration-based but, once again, more specific than
ours in that orchestrations are modelled through a specific class of automata supporting
a restricted language of temporal logic specifications. Another fundamental difference
is that, whereas in [9] the orchestration of a service is provided by an automaton, ours
is provided by a network of processes (as in SCA), which provides a better model for
capturing the dynamic aspects of SOC that arise from run-time discovery and binding
[26]: our notion of composition is not for integration (as in CBD) but for dynamic
interconnection of processes. This is also reflected in the notion of interface: the in-
terfaces used in [9] are meant for design-time composition, the client being statically
bound to the invoked service (which is the same for all invocations); the interfaces
that we proposed address a different form of composition in which the provider (the
“need-fulfilment mechanism”) is procured at run time and, therefore, can differ from
one invocation to the next, as formalised in [32] in a more general algebraic setting.
Being based on a specific language, [9] explores a number of important issues re-
lated to compatibility and consistency that arise naturally in service design when one
considers semantically-rich interactions, e.g., when messages carry data or are cor-
related according to given business protocols. A similar orchestration-based approach
has been presented in [7], which is also synchronous and based on finite-state machines,
and also addresses notions of compatibility and composition of conversation protocols
(though, interestingly, based on branching time). We are studying an extension of our
framework that can support such richer models of interaction (and the compatibility
issues that they raise), for which we are using, as a starting point, the model that we
adopted in the language SRML [33], which has the advantage of being asynchronous.
With respect to aspects related to consistency of composition, which occupy a cen-
tral part of our work, several notions of compatibility have been studied aimed at en-
suring that services are composable, mostly in the context of process-oriented models
such as automata, labelled transition systems or Petri-Nets. Compatibility in this con-
text may have several different meanings. For example, [45] addresses the problem of
ensuring that, at service-discovery time, requirements placed by a requester service are
matched by the discovered services — the requirements of the requester are formulated
in terms of a graph-based model of a protocol that needs to be simulated by the BPEL
orchestration of any provided service that can be discovered. That is, compatibility
is checked over implementations. However, one has to assume that the requester has
formulated its requirements in such a way that, once bound to a discovered service that
meets the requirements, its implementation will effectively work together with that of
the provided service in a consistent way — a problem not addressed in that paper.
A different approach is proposed in [9] where compatibility is tested over the in-
terfaces of services (not their implementations), which is simpler and more likely to be
effective because a good interface should hide (complex) information that is not rele-
vant for compatibility. A limitation of that approach is, as already mentioned, that it is
based on a (synchronous) method-invocation model of interaction. On the other hand,
the notions of interface that are proposed in [9] do not clearly distinguish between
interfaces for clients of the service and interfaces for providers of required external ser-
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vices, i.e., the approach is not formulated in the context of run-time service discovery
and binding. Furthermore, [9] does not propose a model of composition of implemen-
tations (what is called a component algebra in [18]) so one has to assume that imple-
mentations of services with compatible interfaces, when composed, are ‘consistent’.
Our model formulates the notion of consistency at the level of the component algebra
in a way that one can ensure, at design time, that matching required with provided
services at the interface level leads to a consistent implementation of the composite
service when binding the implementations of the requester and the provider services.
5. Concluding Remarks
5.1. Summary
In this paper, we have put forward a component and interface algebras for service-
oriented computing (SOC) inspired by the seminal work of de Alfaro and Henzinger
[18] and the service-component architecture (SCA) [47]:
The component algebra. Components in our framework are asynchronous rela-
tional nets (ARNs) consisting of processes (sets of infinite traces over an alphabet of
messages) interconnected via asynchronous channels. Two operations were defined:
composition and abstraction. Composition takes two ARNs and a collection of chan-
nels that connect pairs of interaction points, one from each ARN. Abstraction maps
ARNs to processes by forgetting their internal structure, which we showed to be com-
positional in relation to the composition operation.
In this setting, we discussed the problem of ensuring that the composition of con-
sistent ARNs (in the sense that they admit a trace that is projected to the behaviours of
every process and channel) is itself consistent. This is a non-trivial problem, especially
if we want to be able to check consistency in a compositional way, i.e., based only on
properties of the individual ARNs and the channels used to interconnect them. This
form of compositionality is required to be able to ensure consistency at design time
(i.e., when the participating processes and channels are specified and implemented),
which is essential in the context of SOC for supporting run-time discovery and binding
(composition) of services.
We characterised a subclass of ARNs for which an answer to this problem can be
provided: those that are both safe (in the sense that their processes and channels imple-
ment safety properties) and progress-enabled (in the sense that every finite joint trace
can be extended with a joint action). We proved that safe progress-enabled ARNs are
consistent – Theo. 2.17 – and closed under composition provided that interconnec-
tions are made through channels that are publication-enabled (i.e., channels that do not
refuse the publication of messages by the processes) and over interaction-points in re-
lation to which the ARNs are delivery-enabled (i.e., processes that do not refuse the
delivery of messages by the channels) – Cor. 2.24.
Given that individual processes are always progress-enabled, all that remains in
order to ensure consistency of composition is to work with safe processes and channels
and check for publication/delivery-enabledness. This can be done at design time over
the implementations of the channels and the processes, the complexity of which we
discussed for closed (safe) reduced non-deterministic Bu¨cchi automata (NBAs).
The interface algebra. A service interface consists of a provides-point (offering
properties to customers) and a collection of requires-points, each of which specifies the
properties of an external service that may be required and of the channel through which
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the external service will be connected. At the level of interfaces, properties (offered and
required) are specified through logical formulas.
Two operations were defined: composition and refinement. Composition takes two
interfaces and a match between a requires-point of one of the interfaces (the client) and
the provides-point of the other (the supplier) – the properties provided by the supplier
entail those required by the client. Refinement strengthens the properties offered at the
provides-point and weakens those of the requires-points. Refinement was shown to be
compositional in relation to the composition operation.
A notion of orchestration of a service-interface by an ARN was also defined and
shown to be compositional in relation to both the composition and refinement of inter-
faces. We then discussed the problem of ensuring that orchestrations are well defined,
i.e., that when interconnected with orchestrations of required services, the resulting
composition is consistent and delivers the properties offered at the provides-point. Us-
ing the results obtained for ARN composition, we are able to ensure consistency pro-
vided that orchestrations are safe, progress-enabled, and delivery-enabled in relation to
the requires-points, and that the specifications of the channels and external services
given at the requires-points denote channels and processes that are safe and either
publication-enabled (in the case of the channels) or delivery-enabled (in the case of
the processes) – Cor. 3.12.
It then remained to discuss how to guarantee that the specifications given at the
requires-points denote safe processes and channels. For that purpose, we presented a
fragment of linear temporal logic – SAFETY-LTL – in which all the behaviours that can
be specified are safety properties. Closed reduced NBAs can be used as implementa-
tions of such specifications. Because checking processes/channels for delivery/publi-
cation enabledness can be done at design time (i.e., when implementations are chosen
for orchestrating service interfaces) over those automata, there is no need for any ad-
ditional checking to be made at discovery/run time to guarantee consistency; the only
checking that needs to be made at run time is that the specifications of provides-points
entail the specifications of the corresponding requires-points. Naturally, these are all
sufficient conditions.
5.2. Further work
A question that arises from the work that we have presented is whether it can be
generalised, either to other models of behaviour or specification logics. For example,
and although justification can be (and was) given for working with the implicit model
of time enforced by SAFETY-LTL, application domains in which timing requirements
are more critical (e.g., finance) would benefit from using an explicit model of time
based on the real numbers. Logics such as SAFETY-MTL [48] could still be used
over such a domain in order to restrict behaviours to safety properties. Probabilistic
models have also been emerging as providing useful ways of addressing behaviour of
services that depend on properties that, such as resource availability or performance,
are intrinsically stochastic. What is not clear is if (and how) one can also generalise the
characterisation of ARNs for which consistency can be ensured. For instance, the proof
of Theo. 2.17 relies on properties of trace semantics (namely finite branching) that
do not generalise immediately to a real-time or probabilistic domain. One point that
we intend to investigate further concerns, indeed, the interplay between consistency,
safety, the behavioural model and the associated logic. Frameworks such as institutions
[36] could provide a starting point, though extensions are clearly required in order to
have a finer characterisation of the topological properties that are required of behaviour
models to address the kind of properties discussed herein.
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Other lines for further work concern the dynamic aspects that are intrinsic to SOC
in virtue of the run-time discovery, selection and binding processes. We plan to use, as
a starting point, the algebraic semantics that we developed for SRML [32]. Important
challenges that arise here relate to the unbounded nature of the configurations (ARNs)
that execute business applications in a service-oriented setting, which is quite different
from the complexity of the processes and communication channels that execute in those
configurations.
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